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Abstract
Adversarial examples are a pervasive phenomenon of machine learning models where seemingly imper-
ceptible perturbations to the input lead to misclassifications for otherwise statistically accurate models. We
propose a geometric framework, drawing on tools from the manifold reconstruction literature, to analyze the
high-dimensional geometry of adversarial examples. In particular, we highlight the importance of codimension:
for low-dimensional data manifolds embedded in high-dimensional space there are many directions off the man-
ifold in which to construct adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are a natural consequence of learning a
decision boundary that classifies the low-dimensional data manifold well, but classifies points near the manifold
incorrectly. Using our geometric framework we prove (1) a tradeoff between robustness under different norms,
(2) that adversarial training in balls around the data is sample inefficient, and (3) sufficient sampling conditions
under which nearest neighbor classifiers and ball-based adversarial training are robust.
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1 Introduction
Deep learning at scale has led to breakthroughs on important problems in computer vision (Krizhevsky et al.
(2012)), natural language processing (Wu et al. (2016)), and robotics (Levine et al. (2015)). Shortly thereafter,
the interesting phenomena of adversarial examples was observed. A seemingly ubiquitous property of machine
learning models where perturbations of the input that are imperceptible to humans reliably lead to confident
incorrect classifications (Szegedy et al. (2013); Goodfellow et al. (2014)). What has ensued is a standard story
from the security literature: a game of cat and mouse where defenses are proposed only to be quickly defeated by
stronger attacks (Athalye et al. (2018)). This has led researchers to develop methods which are provably robust
under specific attack models (Madry et al. (2018); Wong and Kolter (2018); Sinha et al. (2018); Raghunathan et al.
(2018)). As machine learning proliferates into society, including security-critical settings like health care (Esteva
et al. (2017)) or autonomous vehicles (Codevilla et al. (2018)), it is crucial to develop methods that allow us to
understand the vulnerability of our models and design appropriate counter-measures.
In this paper, we propose a geometric framework for analyzing the phenomenon of adversarial examples.
We leverage the observation that datasets encountered in practice exhibit low-dimensional structure despite being
embedded in very high-dimensional input spaces. This property is colloquially referred to as the “Manifold
Hypothesis”: the idea that low-dimensional structure of ‘real’ data leads to tractable learning. We model data
as being sampled from class-specific low-dimensional manifolds embedded in a high-dimensional space. We
consider a threat model where an adversary may choose any point on the data manifold to perturb by  in order
to fool a classifier. In order to be robust to such an adversary, a classifier must be correct everywhere in an -tube
around the data manifold. Observe that, even though the data manifold is a low-dimensional object, this tube
has the same dimension as the entire space the manifold is embedded in. Our analysis argues that adversarial
examples are a natural consequence of learning a decision boundary that classifies all points on a low-dimensional
data manifold correctly, but classifies many points near the manifold incorrectly. The high codimension, the
difference between the dimension of the data manifold and the dimension of the embedding space, is a key source
of the pervasiveness of adversarial examples.
Our paper makes the following contributions. First, we develop a geometric framework, inspired by the
manifold reconstruction literature, that formalizes the manifold hypothesis described above and our attack model.
Second, we highlight the role codimension plays in vulnerability to adversarial examples. As the codimension
increases, there are an increasing number of directions off the data manifold in which to construct adversarial
perturbations. Prior work has attributed vulnerability to adversarial examples to input dimension (Gilmer et al.
(2018)). This is the first work that investigates the role of codimension in adversarial examples. Interestingly,
we find that different classification algorithms are less sensitive to changes in codimension. Third, we apply this
framework to prove the following results: (1) we show that the choice of norm to restrict an adversary is important
in that there exists a tradeoff between being robust to different norms: we present a classification problem where
improving robustness under the ‖ · ‖∞ norm requires a loss of Ω(1 − 1/
√
d) in robustness to the ‖ · ‖2 norm;
(2) we show that a common approach, training against adversarial examples drawn from balls around the training
set, is insufficient to learn robust decision boundaries with realistic amounts of data; and (3) we show that nearest
neighbor classifiers do not suffer from this insufficiency, due to geometric properties of their decision boundary
away from data, and thus represent a potentially robust classification algorithm. Finally we provide experimental
evidence on synthetic datasets and MNIST that support our theoretical results.
2 Related Work
This paper approaches the problem of adversarial examples using techniques and intuition from the manifold
reconstruction literature. Both fields have a great deal of prior work, so we focus on only the most related papers
here.
2.1 Adversarial Examples
Some previous work has considered the relationships between adversarial examples and high dimensional geom-
etry. Franceschi et al. (2018) explore the robustness of classifiers to random noise in terms of distance to the
decision boundary, under the assumption that the decision boundary is locally flat. The work of Gilmer et al.
(2018) experimentally evaluated the setting of two concentric under-sampled 499-spheres embedded in R500, and
concluded that adversarial examples occur on the data manifold. In contrast, we present a geometric framework
for proving robustness guarantees for learning algorithms, that makes no assumptions on the decision boundary.
We carefully sample the data manifold in order to highlight the importance of codimension; adversarial examples
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exist even when the manifold is perfectly classified. Additionally we explore the importance of the spacing be-
tween the constituent data manifolds, sampling requirements for learning algorithms, and the relationship between
model complexity and robustness.
Wang et al. (2018) explore the robustness of k-nearest neighbor classifiers to adversarial examples. In the
setting where the Bayes optimal classifier is uncertain about the true label of each point, they show that k-nearest
neighbors is not robust if k is a small constant. They also show that if k ∈ Ω(√dn log n), then k-nearest neighbors
is robust. Using our geometric framework we show a complementary result: in the setting where each point is
certain of its label, 1-nearest neighbors is robust to adversarial examples.
The decision and medial axes defined in Section 3 are maximum margin decision boundaries. Hard margin
SVMs define define a linear separator with maximum margin, maximum distance from the training data (Cortes
and Vapnik (1995)). Kernel methods allow for maximum margin decision boundaries that are non-linear by
using additional features to project the data into a higher-dimensional feature space (Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini
(2004)). The decision and medial axes generalize the notion of maximum margin to account for the arbitrary
curvature of the data manifolds. There have been attempts to incorporate maximum margins into deep learning
(Sun et al. (2016); Liu et al. (2016); Liang et al. (2017); Elsayed et al. (2018)), often by designing loss functions
that encourage large margins at either the output (Sun et al. (2016)) or at any layer (Elsayed et al. (2018)). In
contrast, the decision axis is defined on the input space and we use it as an analysis tool for proving robustness
guarantees.
2.2 Manifold Reconstruction
Manifold reconstruction is the problem of discovering the structure of a k-dimensional manifold embedded in Rd,
given only a set of points sampled from the manifold. A large vein of research in manifold reconstruction develops
algorithms that are provably good: if the points sampled from the underlying manifold are sufficiently dense,
these algorithms are guaranteed to produce a geometrically accurate representation of the unknown manifold
with the correct topology. The output of these algorithms is often a simplicial complex, a set of simplices such
as triangles, tetrahedra, and higher-dimensional variants, that approximate the unknown manifold. In particular
these algorithms output subsets of the Delaunay triangulation, which along with their geometric dual the Voronoi
diagram, have properties that aid in proving geometric and topological guarantees (Edelsbrunner and Shah (1997)).
The field first focused on curve reconstruction in R2 (Amenta et al. (1998)) and subsequently in R3 (Dey and
Kumar (1999)). Soon after algorithms were developed for surface reconstruction in R3, both in the noise-free
setting (Amenta and Bern (1999); Amenta et al. (2002)) and in the presence of noise (Dey and Goswami (2004)).
We borrow heavily from the analysis tools of these early works, including the medial axis and the reach. However
we emphasize that we have adapted these tools to the learning setting. To the best of our knowledge, our work is
the first to consider the medial axis under different norms.
In higher-dimensional embedding spaces (large d), manifold reconstruction algorithms face the curse of di-
mensionality. In particular, the Delaunay triangulation, which forms the bedrock of algorithms in low-dimensions,
of n vertices in Rd can have up to Θ(ndd/2e) simplices. To circumvent the curse of dimensionality, algorithms
were proposed that compute subsets of the Delaunay triangulation restricted to the k-dimensional tangent spaces of
the manifold at each sample point (Boissonnat and Ghosh (2014)). Unfortunately, progress on higher-dimensional
manifolds has been limited due to the presence of so-called “sliver” simplices, poorly shaped simplices that cause
in-consistences between the local triangulations constructed in each tangent space (Cheng et al. (2005); Boisson-
nat and Ghosh (2014)). Techniques that provably remove sliver simplices have prohibitive sampling requirements
(Cheng et al. (2000); Boissonnat and Ghosh (2014)). Even in the special case of surfaces (k = 2) embedded
in high dimensions (d > 3), algorithms with practical sampling requirements have only recently been proposed
(Khoury and Shewchuk (2016)). Our use of tubular neighborhoods as a tool for analysis is borrowed from Dey
et al. (2005) and Khoury and Shewchuk (2016).
In this paper we are interested in learning robust decision boundaries, not reconstructing the underlying data
manifolds, and so we avoid the use of Delaunay triangulations and their difficulties entirely. In Section 5 we
present robustness guarantees for two learning algorithms in terms of a sampling condition on the underlying
manifold. These sampling requirements scale with the dimension of the underlying manifold k, not with the
dimension of the embedding space d.
3 The Geometry of Data
We model data as being sampled from a set of low-dimensional manifolds (with or without boundary) embedded
in a high-dimensional space Rd. We use k to denote the dimension of a manifold M ⊂ Rd. The special case
of a 1-manifold is called a curve, and a 2-manifold is a surface. The codimension ofM is d − k, the difference
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between the dimension of the manifold and the dimension of the embedding space. The “Manifold Hypothesis”
is the observation that in practice, data is often sampled from manifolds, usually of high codimension.
In this paper we are primarily interested in the classification problem. Thus we model data as being sampled
from C class manifoldsM1, . . . ,MC , one for each class. When we wish to refer to the entire space from which
a dataset is sampled, we refer to the data manifoldM = ∪1≤j≤CMj . We often work with a finite sample of n
points, X ⊂ M, and we write X = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn}. Each sample point Xi has an accompanying class label
yi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , C} indicating which manifoldMyi the point Xi is sampled from.
Consider a ‖·‖p-ballB centered at some point c ∈ Rd and imagine growingB by increasing its radius starting
from zero. For nearly all starting points c, the ball B eventually intersects one, and only one, of theMi’s. Thus
the nearest point to c onM, in the norm ‖·‖p, lies onMi. (Note that the nearest point onMi need not be unique.)
The decision axis Λp of M is the set of points c such that the boundary of B intersects two or more of the
Mi, but the interior of B does not intersect M at all. In other words, the decision axis Λp is the set of points
that have two or more closest points, in the norm ‖ · ‖p, on distinct class manifolds. See Figure 1. The decision
axis is inspired by the medial axis, which was first proposed by Blum (1967) in the context of image analysis
and subsequently modified for the purposes of curve and surface reconstruction by Amenta et al. (1998; 2002).
We have modified the definition to account for multiple class manifolds and have renamed our variant in order to
avoid confusion in the future.
The decision axis Λp can intuitively be thought of as a decision boundary that is optimal in the following sense.
First, Λp separates the class manifolds when they do not intersect (Lemma 8). Second, each point of Λp is as far
away from the class manifolds as possible in the norm ‖ · ‖p. As shown in the leftmost example in Figure 1, in
the case of two linearly separable circles of equal radius, the decision axis Λ2 is exactly the line that separates the
data with maximum margin. For arbitrary manifolds, Λp generalizes the notion of maximum margin to account
for the arbitrary curvature of the class manifolds.
M1
M1
M1
M2
M2
M2
⇤2
⇤2
⇤2
rch2 ⇤2
rch2 ⇤2
rch2 ⇤2
Figure 1: Examples of the decision axis Λ2, shown here in green, for different data manifolds. Intuitively, the
decision axis captures an optimal decision boundary between the data manifolds. It’s optimal in the sense that
each point on the decision axis is as far away from each data manifold as possible. Notice that in the first example,
the decision axis coincides with the maximum margin line.
Let T ⊂ Rd be any set. The reach rchp (T ;M) of M is defined as infx∈M,y∈T ‖x − y‖p. When M is
compact, the reach is achieved by the point onM that is closest to T under the ‖ · ‖p norm. We will dropM from
the notation when it is understood from context.
Finally, an -tubular neighborhood of M is defined as M,p = {x ∈ Rd : infy∈M ‖x − y‖p ≤ }. That
is, M,p is the set of all points whose distance to M under the metric induced by ‖ · ‖p is less than . Note
that while M is k-dimensional, M,p is always d-dimensional. Tubular neighborhoods are how we rigorously
define adversarial examples. Consider a classifier f : Rd → [C] for M. An -adversarial example is a point
x ∈ M,pi such that f(x) 6= i. A classifier f is robust to all -adversarial examples when f correctly classifies
not onlyM, but all ofM,p. Thus the problem of being robust to adversarial examples is rightly seen as one of
generalization. In this paper we will be primarily concerned with exploring the conditions under which we can
provably learn a decision boundary that correctly classifiesM,p. When  < rchp Λp, the decision axis Λp is one
decision boundary that correctly classifiesM,p (Corollary 10). Throughout the remainder of the paper we will
drop the p inM,p from the notation, instead writingM; the norm will always be clear from context.
The geometric quantities defined above can be defined more generally for any distance metric d(·, ·). In this
paper we will focus exclusively on the metrics induced by the norms ‖ · ‖p for p > 0. The decision axis under
‖ · ‖2 is in general not identical to the decision axis under ‖ · ‖∞. In Section 4 we will prove that since Λ2 is not
identical to Λ∞ there exists a tradeoff in the robustness of any decision boundary between the two norms.
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Figure 2: As the dimension increases, the rch2 (Λ∞;S1 ∪ S2) decreases, and so an ‖ · ‖∞ robust classifier is less
robust to ‖ · ‖2 attacks. The dashed lines are placed at 1/
√
d, where our theoretical results suggest we should start
finding ‖ · ‖2 adversarial examples. We use the robust ‖ · ‖∞ loss of Wong and Kolter (2018)
4 A Provable Tradeoff in Robustness Between Norms
Schott et al. (2018) explore the vulnerability of robust classifiers to attacks under different norms. In particu-
lar, they take the robust pretrained classifier of Madry et al. (2018), which was trained to be robust to ‖ · ‖∞-
perturbations, and subject it to ‖ · ‖0 and ‖ · ‖2 attacks. They show that accuracy drops to 0% under ‖ · ‖0 attacks
and to 35% under ‖ · ‖2. Here we explain why poor robustness under the norm ‖ · ‖2 should be expected.
We say a decision boundary Df for a classifier f is -robust in the ‖ · ‖p norm if  < rchpDf . In words,
starting from any point x ∈ M, a perturbation ηx must have p-norm greater than rchpDf to cross the decision
boundary. The most robust decision boundary to ‖ · ‖p-perturbations is Λp. In Theorem 1 we construct a learning
setting where Λ2 is distinct from Λ∞. Thus, in general, no single decision boundary can be optimally robust in
all norms.
Theorem 1. Let S1, S2 ⊂ Rd+1 be two concentric d-spheres with radii r1 < r2 respectively. Let S = S1∪S2 and
let Λ2,Λ∞ be the ‖ · ‖2 and ‖ · ‖∞ decision axes of S. Then Λ2 6= Λ∞. Furthermore rch2 Λ∞ ∈ O(rch2 Λ2/
√
d).
Proof. The decision axis under ‖ · ‖2, Λ2, is just the d-sphere with radius (r1 + r2)/2. However, Λ∞ is not
identical to Λ2 in this setting; in fact most Λ∞ of approaches S1 as d increases.
The geometry of a ‖ · ‖∞-ball B∆ centered at m ∈ Rd with radius ∆ is that of a hypercube centered at m with
side length 2∆. To find a point on Λ∞ we place B∆ tangent to the north pole q of S1 so that the corners of B∆
touch S2. The north pole has coordinate representation q = (0, . . . , 0, r1), the center m = (0, . . . , 0, r1 + ∆), and
a corner of B∆ can be expressed as p = (∆, . . . ,∆, r1 + 2∆). Additionally we have the constraint that ‖p‖2 = r2
since p ∈ S2. Then we can solve for ∆ as
r22 = ‖p‖22 = (d− 1)∆2 + (r1 + 2∆)2 = (d+ 3)∆2 + 4r1∆ + r21;
∆ =
−2r1 +
√
r21 + 3r
2
2 + d(r
2
2 − r21)
d+ 3
,
where the last step follows from the quadratic formula and the fact that ∆ > 0. For fixed r1, r2, the value ∆ scales
as O(1/√d). It follows that rch2 Λ∞ ∈ O(rch2 Λ2/
√
d).
From Theorem 1 we conclude that the minimum distance from S1 to Λ∞ under the ‖ · ‖2 norm is upper
bounded as rch2 Λ∞ ∈ O(rch2 Λ2/
√
d). If a classifier f is trained to learn Λ∞, an adversary, starting on S1, can
construct an ‖ · ‖2 adversarial example for a perturbation as small as O(1/
√
d). Thus we should expect f to be
less robust to ‖ · ‖2-perturbations. Figure 2 verifies this result experimentally.
We expect that Λ2 6= Λ∞ is the common case in practice. For example, Theorem 1 extends immediately
to concentric cylinders and intertwined tori by considering 2-dimensional planar cross-sections. In general, we
expect that Λ2 6= Λ∞ in situations where a 2-dimensional cross-section withM has nontrivial curvature.
Theorem 1 is important because, even in recent literature, researchers have attributed this phenomena to over-
fitting. Schott et al. (2018) state that “the widely recognized and by far most successful defense by Madry et al. (1)
overfits on the L∞ metric (its highly susceptible to L2 and L0 perturbations)” (emphasis ours). We disagree; the
Madry et al. (2018) classifier performed exactly as intended. It learned a decision boundary that is robust under
‖ · ‖∞, which we have shown is quite different from the most robust decision boundary under ‖ · ‖2.
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Interestingly, the proposed models of Schott et al. (2018) also suffer from this tradeoff. Their model ABS has
accuracy 80% to ‖ · ‖2 attacks but drops to 8% for ‖ · ‖∞. Similarly their model ABS Binary has accuracy 77% to
‖ · ‖∞ attacks but drops to 39% for ‖ · ‖2 attacks.
We reiterate, in general, no single decision boundary can be optimally robust in all norms.
5 Provably Robust Classifiers
Adversarial training, the process of training on adversarial examples generated in a ‖ · ‖p-ball around the training
data, is a very natural approach to constructing robust models (Goodfellow et al. (2014); Madry et al. (2018)). In
our notation this corresponds to training on samples drawn from X for some . While natural, we show that there
are simple settings where this approach is much less sample-efficient than other classification algorithms, if the
only guarantee is correctness in X.
Define a learning algorithmLwith the property that, given a training setX ⊂M sampled from a manifoldM,
L outputs a model fL such that for every x ∈ X with label y, and every xˆ ∈ B(x, rchp Λp), fL(xˆ) = fL(x) = y.
Here B(x, r) denotes the ball centered at x of radius r in the relevant norm. That is, L learns a model that outputs
the same label for any ‖ · ‖p-perturbation of x up to rchp Λp as it outputs for x. L is our theoretical model of
adversarial training (Goodfellow et al. (2014); Madry et al. (2018)). Theorem 2 states that L is sample inefficient
in high codimensions.
Theorem 2. There exists a classification algorithm A that, for a particular choice ofM, correctly classifiesM
using exponentially fewer samples than are required for L to correctly classifyM.
Theorem 2 follows from Theorems 3 and 4. In Theorems 3 and 4 we will prove that a nearest neighbor classifier
fnn is one such classification algorithm. Nearest neighbor classifiers are naturally robust in high codimensions
because the Voronoi cells of X are elongated in the directions normal toM when X is dense (Dey (2007)).
Before we state Theorem 3 we must introduce a sampling condition onM. A δ-cover of a manifoldM in the
norm ‖·‖p is a finite set of pointsX such that for every x ∈M there existsXi such that ‖x−Xi‖p ≤ δ. Theorem 3
gives a sufficient sampling condition for fL to correctly classifyM for all manifoldsM. Theorem 3 also provides
a sufficient sampling condition for a nearest neighbor classifier fnn to correctly classifyM, which is substantially
less dense than that of fL. Thus different classification algorithms have different sampling requirements in high
codimensions.
Theorem 3. LetM ⊂ Rd be a k-dimensional manifold and let  < rchp Λp for any p > 0. Let fnn be a nearest
neighbor classifier and let fL be the output of a learning algorithm L as described above. Let Xnn, XL ⊂ M
denote the training sets for fnn and L respectively. We have the following sampling guarantees:
1. If Xnn is a δ-cover for δ ≤ 2(rchp Λp − ) then fnn correctly classifiesM.
2. If XL is a δ-cover for δ ≤ rchp Λp −  then fL correctly classifiesM.
Proof. Here we use d(·, ·) to denote the metric induced by the ‖ · ‖p norm. We begin by proving (1). Let q ∈M
be any point inM. Suppose without loss of generality that q ∈Mi for some class i. The distance d(q,Mj) from
q to any other data manifoldMj , and thus any sample onMj , is lower bounded by d(q,Mj) ≥ 2 rchp Λp − .
See Figure 3. It is then both necessary and sufficient that there exists a x ∈Mi such that d(q, x) < 2 rchp Λp − 
for fnn(q) = i. (Necessary since a properly placed sample onMj can achieve the lower bound on d(q,Mj).)
The distance from q to the nearest sample x onMi is d(q, x) ≤ + δ for some δ > 0. The question is how large
can we allow δ to be and still guarantee that fnn correctly classifiesM? We need
d(q, x) ≤ + δ ≤ 2 rchp Λp −  ≤ d(q,Mj)
which implies that δ ≤ 2(rchp Λp− ). It follows that a δ-cover with δ = 2(rchp Λp− ) is sufficient, and in some
cases necessary, to guarantee that fnn correctly classifiesM.
Next we prove (2). As before let q ∈ Mi . It is both necessary and sufficient for q ∈ B(x, rchp Λp) for some
sample x ∈ Mi to guarantee that fL(q) = i, by definition of L. The distance to the nearest sample x onMi is
d(q, x) ≤ + δ for some δ > 0. Thus it suffices that δ ≤ rchp Λp − .
In Appendix B we provide additional robustness results for nearest neighbors including: (1) a similar robust-
ness guarantee as in Theorem 3 when noise is introduced into the samples and (2) that the decision boundaryDfnn
of fnn approaches the decision axis as the sample density increases.
The bounds on δ in Theorem 3 are sufficient, but they are not always necessary. There exist manifolds where
the bounds in Theorem 3 are pessimistic, and less dense samples corresponding to larger values of δ would suffice.
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Figure 3: Proof of Theorem 3. The distance from a query point q toM2, and thus the closest incorrectly labeled
sample, is lower bounded by the distance necessary to reach the medial axis Λp plus the distance from Λp toM2.
Next we will show a setting where bounds on δ similar to those in Theorem 3 are necessary. In this setting,
the difference of a factor of 2 in δ between the sampling requirements of fnn and fL leads to an exponential gap
between the sizes of Xnn and XL necessary to achieve the same amount of robustness.
Define Π1 = {x ∈ Rd : ` ≤ x1, . . . , xk ≤ µ and xk+1 = . . . = xd = 0}; that is Π1 is a subset of the
x1-. . .-xk-plane bounded between the coordinates [`, µ]. Similarly define Π2 = {x ∈ Rd : ` ≤ x1, . . . , xk ≤
µ and xk+1 = . . . = xd−1 = 0 and xd = 2}. Note that Π2 lies in the subspace xd = 2; thus rch2 Λ2 = 1, where
Λ2 is the decision axis of Π = Π1 ∪ Π2. In the ‖ · ‖2 norm we can show that the gap in Theorem 3 is necessary
for Π = Π1 ∪Π2. Furthermore the bounds we derive for δ-covers for Π for both fnn and fL are tight. Combined
with well-known properties of covers, we get that the ratio |XL|/|Xnn| is exponential in k.
Theorem 4. Let Π = Π1 ∪ Π2 as described above. Let Xnn, XL ⊂ Π be minimum training sets necessary to
guarantee that fnn and fL correctly classifyM. Then we have that
|XL|
|Xnn| ≥ 2
k/2 (1)
Proof. Let q ∈ Π1. Since Π1 is flat, the distance to from q to the nearest sample x ∈ Π1 is bounded as ‖q−x‖2 ≤√
2 + δ2. For fnn(q) = 1 we need that ‖q− x‖2 ≤ 2− , and so it suffices that δ ≤ 2
√
1− . In this setting, this
is also necessary; should δ be any larger a property placed sample on Π2 can claim q in its Voronoi cell.
Similarly for fL(q) = 1 we need that ‖q − x‖2 ≤ 1, and so it suffices that δ ≤
√
1− 2. In this setting, this is
also necessary; should δ be any larger, q lies outside of every ‖ ·‖2-ball B(x, 1) and so L is free to learn a decision
boundary that misclassifies q.
Let N (δ,M) denote the size of the minimum δ-cover ofM. Since Π is flat (has no curvature) and since the
intersection of Π with a d-ball centered at a point on Π is a k-ball, a standard volume argument can be applied in
the affine subspace aff Π to conclude that N (δ,Π) ∈ Θ (volk Π/δk). So we have
N (√1− 2,Π)
N (2√1− ,Π) = 2
k
(
1
1 + 
)k/2
≥ 2k/2
Since Π is constant in both settings, the factor volk Π as well as the constant factors hidden by Θ(·) cancel.
(Note that we are using the fact that Π1,Π2 have finite k-dimensional volume.) The inequality follows from the
fact that the expression (1 + )−k/2 is monotonically decreasing on the interval [0, 1] and takes value 2−k/2 at
 = 1.
We have shown that both L and nearest neighbor classifiers learn robust decision boundaries when provided
sufficiently dense samples of M. However there are settings where nearest neighbors is exponentially more
sample-efficient than L in achieving the same amount of robustness. We experimentally verify these theoretical
results in Section 8.1.
6 X is a Poor Model ofM
Madry et al. (2018) suggest training a robust classifier with the help of an adversary which, at each iteration,
produces -perturbations around the training set that are incorrectly classified. In our notation, this corresponds to
learning a decision boundary that correctly classifiesX = {x ∈ Rd : ‖x−Xi‖2 ≤  for some training point Xi}.
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Figure 4: To construct an δ-cover we place sample points, shown here in black, along a regular grid with spacing
∆. The blue points are the furthest points of Π from the sample. To cover Π we need ∆ = 2δ/
√
k.
We believe this approach is insufficiently robust in practice, asX is often a poor model forM. In this section, we
show that the volume volX is often a vanishingly small percentage of volM. These results shed light on why
the ball-based learning algorithm L defined in Section 5 is so much less sample-efficient than nearest neighbor
classifiers. In Section 8.1 we experimentally verify these observations by showing that in high-dimensional space
it is easy to find adversarial examples even after training against a strong adversary. For the remainder of this
section we will consider the ‖ · ‖2 norm.
Theorem 5. LetM ⊂ Rd be a k-dimensional manifold embedded in Rd such that volkM < ∞. Let X ⊂ M
be a finite set of points sampled fromM. Suppose that  ≤ rch2 Ξ where Ξ is the medial axis ofM, defined as in
Dey (2007). Then the percentage ofM covered by X is upper bounded by
volX
volM ≤
pik/2Γ(d−k2 + 1)
Γ(d2 + 1)
k
volkM|X| ∈ O
((
2pi
d− k
)k/2
k
volkM|X|
)
. (2)
As the codimension (d− k)→∞, Equation 2 approaches 0, for any fixed |X|.
Proof. Assuming the balls centered on the samples in X are disjoint we get the upper bound
volX ≤ volB|X| = pi
d/2
Γ(d2 + 1)
d|X|. (3)
This is identical to the reasoning in Equation 5.
The medial axis Ξ ofM is defined as the closure of the set of all points in Rd that have two or more closest
points onM in the norm ‖ · ‖2. The medial axis Ξ is similar to the decision axis Λ2, except that the nearest points
do not need to be on distinct class manifolds. For  ≤ rch2 Ξ, we have the lower bound
volM ≥ vold−k Bd−k volkM =
pi(d−k)/2
Γ
(
d−k
2 + 1
)d−k volkM. (4)
Combining Equations 3 and 4 gives the result. To get the asymptotic result we apply Stirling’s approximation
to get
Γ(d−k2 + 1)
Γ(d2 + 1)
≈ (2e)k/2 (d− k)
(d−k+1)/2
d(d+1)/2
= (2e)k/2
(
d−k
d
)(d+1)/2
(d− k)k/2
= (2e)k/2
(
1− kd
)(d+1)/2
(d− k)k/2
≈
(
2
d− k
)k/2
.
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The last step follows from the fact that limd→∞(1 − k/d)(d+1)/2 = e−k/2, where e is the base of the natural
logarithm.
In high codimension, even moderate under-sampling of M leads to a significant loss of coverage of M
because the volume of the union of balls centered at the samples shrinks faster than the volume ofM. Theorem 5
states that in high codimensions the fraction ofM covered byX goes to 0. Almost nothing is covered byX for
training set sizes that are realistic in practice. Thus X is a poor model ofM, and high classificaiton accuracy
on X does not imply high accuracy inM.
Note that an alternative way of defining the ratio volX/ volM is as vol (X ∩M)/ volM. This is
equivalent in our setting since X ⊂M and so X ⊂M.
For the remainder of the section we provide intuition for Theorem 5 by considering the special case of k-
dimensional planes. Define Π = {x ∈ Rd : ` ≤ x1, . . . , xk ≤ µ and xk+1 = . . . = xd = 0}; that is Π is a
subset of the x1-. . .-xk-plane bounded between the coordinates [`, µ]. Recall that a δ-cover of a manifoldM in
the norm ‖ · ‖2 is a finite set of points X such that for every x ∈ M there exists Xi such that ‖x − Xi‖2 ≤ δ.
It is easy to construct an explicit δ-cover X of Π: place sample points at the vertices of a regular grid, shown in
Figure 4 by the black vertices. The centers of the cubes of this regular grid, shown in blue in Figure 4, are the
furthest points from the samples. The distance from the vertices of the grid to the centers is
√
k∆/2 where ∆ is
the spacing between points along an axis of the grid. To construct a δ-cover we need
√
k∆/2 = δ which gives a
spacing of ∆ = 2δ/
√
k. The size of this sample is |X| =
(√
k(µ−`)
2δ
)k
. Note that |X| scales exponentially in k,
the dimension of Π, not in d, the dimension of the embedding space.
⇧
Lower Bound
⇧ 
Figure 5: An illustration of the lower bound technique used in Equation 6. The volume vol Πδ shown in the black
dashed lines, is bounded from below by placing a (d−k)-dimensional ball of radius δ at each point of Π, shown in
green. In this illustration, a 1-dimensional manifold is embedded in 2 dimensions, so these balls are 1-dimensional
line segments.
Recall that Πδ is the δ-tubular neighborhood of Π. The δ-balls around X , which comprise Xδ , cover Π and so
any robust approach that guarantees correct classification withinXδ will achieve perfect accuracy on Π. However,
we will show thatXδ covers only a vanishingly small fraction of Πδ . LetBδ denote the d-ball of radius δ centered
at the origin. An upper bound on the volume of Xδ is
volXδ ≤ volBδ|X| = pi
d/2
Γ(d2 + 1)
δd
(√
k(µ− `)
2δ
)k
=
pid/2
Γ(d2 + 1)
δ(d−k)
(√
k(µ− `)
2
)k
. (5)
Next we bound the volume vol Πδ from below. Intuitively, a lower bound on the volume can be derived by
placing a (d − k)-dimensional ball in the normal space at each point of Π and integrating the volumes. Figure 4
(Right) illustrates the lower bound argument in the case of k = 1, d = 2.
vol Πδ ≥ vold−k Bd−kδ volk Π =
pi(d−k)/2
Γ
(
d−k
2 + 1
)δd−k(µ− `)k. (6)
Combining Equations 5 and 6 gives an upper bound on the percentage of Πδ that is covered by X.
volXδ
vol Πδ
≤ pi
k/2Γ
(
d−k
2 + 1
)
Γ
(
d
2 + 1
) (√k
2
)k
. (7)
Notice that the factors involving δ and (µ− `) cancel. Figure 6 (Left) shows that this expression approaches 0 as
the codimension (d− k) of Π increases.
Suppose we set δ = 1 and construct a 1-cover of Π. The number of points necessary to cover Π with balls of
radius 1 depends only on k, not the embedding dimension d. However the number of points necessary to cover
the tubular neighborhood Π1 with balls of radius 1 increases depends on both k and d. In Theorem 6 we derive a
lower bound on the number of samples necessary to cover Π1.
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Figure 6: We plot the upper bound in Equation 7 on the left. As the codimension increases, the percentage of
volume of Π1 covered by 1-balls around the 1-sample approaches 0. On the right we plot the number of samples
necessary to cover Π, shown in blue, against the number of samples necessary to cover Π1, shown in orange, as
the codimension increases.
Theorem 6. Let Π be a bounded k-flat as described above, bounded along each axis by ` < µ. Let n denote the
number of samples necessary to cover the 1-tubular neighborhood Π1 of Π with ‖ · ‖2-balls of radius 1. That is
let n be the minimum value for which there exists a finite sample X of size n such that Π1 ⊂ ∪x∈XB(x, 1) = X1.
Then
n ≥ pi
−k/2Γ
(
d
2 + 1
)
Γ
(
d−k
2 + 1
) (µ− `)k ∈ Ω((d− k
2pi
)k/2
(µ− `)k
)
. (8)
Proof. We first construct an upper bound by generously assuming that the balls centered at the samples are disjoint.
That is
volXδ
vol Πδ
≤ n volBδ
vol Πδ
. (9)
To guarantee that Π1 ⊂ ∪x∈XB(x, 1) = X1 we set the left hand side of Equation 9 equal to 1 and solve for n.
1 =
volXδ
vol Πδ
≤ n volBδ
vol Πδ
n ≥ vol Π
δ
volBδ
≥ pi
−k/2Γ
(
d
2 + 1
)
Γ
(
d−k
2 + 1
) (µ− `
δ
)k
The last inequality follows from Equation 6. Setting δ = 1 gives the result. The asymptotic result is similar to the
argument in the proof of Theorem 5.
Theorem 6 states that, in general, it takes many fewer samples to accurately model M than to model M.
Figure 6 (Right) compares the number of points necessary to construct a 1-cover of Π with the lower bound on
the number necessary to cover Π1 from Theorem 6. The number of points necessary to cover Π1 increases as
Ω
(
(d− k)k/2), scaling polynomially in d and exponentially in k. In contrast, the number necessary to construct
a 1-cover of Π remains constant as d increases, depending only on k.
Our lower bound of Ω
(
(d− k)k/2) samples is similar to the work of Schmidt et al. (2018) who prove that, in
the simple Gaussian setting, robustness requires as much as Ω(
√
d) more samples. Their arguments are statistical
while ours are geometric.
Approaches that produce robust classifiers by generating adversarial examples in the -balls centered on the
training set do not accurately model M, and it will take many more samples to do so. If the method behaves
arbitrarily outside of the -balls that define X, adversarial examples will still exist and it will likely be easy to
find them. The reason deep learning has performed so well on a variety of tasks, in spite of the brittleness made
apparent by adversarial examples, is because it is much easier to perform well onM than it is to perform well on
M.
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7 A Lower Bound on Model Expressiveness
7.1 A Simple Example
Consider the case of two concentric circles C1, C2 with radii r1 < r2 respectively, as illustrated in Figure 7. Each
circle represents a different class of data. Suppose that we train a parametric model f(x;θ) with p parameters so
that for x ∈ C1, f(x;θ) > 0 and for x ∈ C2, f(x;θ) < 0. How does the number of parameters p necessary
to ensure that such a decision boundary can be expressed by f(·;θ) increase as the gap between C1 and C2
decreases?
Suppose that we first lift C1 and C2 to a parabola in R3 via map φ(x1, x2) = (x1, x2, x21 + x22). That is, we
construct the sets C+1 = {φ(x1, x2) : (x1, x2) ∈ C1} and similarly for C+2 . After applying φ, C+1 and C+2 are
linearly separable for any r2 − r1 > 0. The linear decision boundary in R3 maps back to a circle in R2 that
separates C1 and C2. This is not the case for deep networks; the number of parameters necessary to separate C1
and C2 will depend on the gap r2 − r1.
In the important special case where f is parameterized by a fully connected deep network with ` layers,
h hidden units per layer, and ReLU activations, Raghu et al. (2017) prove that f subdivides the input space into
convex polytopes. In each convex polytope, f defines a linear function that agrees on the boundary of the polytope
with its neighbors. They showed that, when the inputs are in R2, the number of polytopes in the subdivision is at
most O(h2`) (Raghu et al. (2017)[Theorem 1]).
Let Sf denote the subdivision of space into convex polytopes induced by f . Consider the decision boundary
Df = {x ∈ Rd : f(x;θ) = 0} of f . Df can be constructed by examining each polytope P ∈ Sf and solving
the linear equation fP (x) = 0 where fP is the linear function defined on P by f . Since fP is linear the solution
is either (1) the empty set, (2) a single line segment, or (3) all of P . Case (3) is a degenerate case and there
are ways to perturb f by an infinitesimally small amount such that case (3) never occurs and the classification
accuracy is unchanged. Thus we conclude that Df is a piecewise-linear curve comprised of line segments. (In
higher dimensions Df is composed of subsets of hyperplanes.) See Figure 7.
Suppose that Df separates C1 from C2 and let s ∈ Df be a line segment of the decision boundary. Since s
lies in the space between C1 and C2, the length |s| ≤ 2
√
r22 − r21 , which is tight when s is tangent to C1 and
touches C2 at both of its endpoints. For Df to separate C1 from C2, Df must make a full rotation of 2pi around
the origin. The portion of this rotation that s can contribute is upper bounded by 2 arccos r1r2 . Thus the number of
line segments that comprise Df is lower bounded by piarccos r1r2 .
As r2 → r1, the minimum number of segment necessary to separate C1 from C2 piarccos r1r2 → ∞. Since each
polytope P ∈ Sf can contribute at most one line segment to Df , the size of the model necessary to represent a
decision boundary that separates C1 from C2 also increases as the circles get closer together.
Now consider C1 and C

2 under the ‖ · ‖2 norm, defined as Ci = {x ∈ R2 : ‖x− Ci‖2 ≤ }. Suppose that a
fully connected network f described as above has sufficiently many parameters to represent a decision boundary
that separates C1 from C2. Is f also capable of learning a robust decision boundary that separates C1 from C

2?
✏✏
C1
C2
r1
r2
Df Df Df
C✏1
C✏2
✏✏
Figure 7: Separating two classes of data sampled from C1 and C2 may require a decision boundary Df with only
a few linear segments. However a decision boundary Df that is robust to -perturbations must lie in gap between
C1 and C

2. Learning a robust decision boundary may require more linear segments and thus a more expressive
model. As we increase , demanding a more robust decision boundary, the gap between C1 and C

2 decreases, and
so the number of linear segments increases towards∞.
For Df to separate C1 from C2 it must lie in the region between C1 and C2. In this setting each segment can
contribute at most 2 arccos r1+r2− to the full 2pi rotation around the origin. The minimum number of line segments
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that comprise a robust decision boundary Df is lower bounded by pi
arccos
r1+
r2−
. As  → r2−r12 this quantity
approaches∞. Even if f is capable of separating C1 from C2 we can choose  such that pi
arccos
r1+
r2+
∈ ω(h2`).
This simple example shows that learning decision boundaries that are robust to -adversarial examples may
require substantially more powerful models than what is required to learn the original distributions. Furthermore
the amount of additional resources necessary is dependent upon the amount of robustness required.
7.2 An Exponential Lower Bound
We present an exponential lower bound on the number of linear regions necessary to represent a decision boundary
that is robust to ‖·‖2-perturbations of at most  ≤ rch2 Λ2−τ , in the simple case of two concentric (d−1)-spheres.
Theorem 7. Let S1, S2 ⊂ Rd be two concentric (d − 1)-spheres with radii r1 < r2 respectively and let S =
S1 ∪ S2. Let f : Rd → R be a fully connected neural network with ReLU activations. Suppose that f correctly
classifies Srch2 Λ2−τ for some τ ∈ [0, rch2 Λ2]. Said differently, the decision boundary of f lies in a τ -tubular
neighborhood of the decision axis, Df ⊂ Λτ2 . Then the number of linear regions N into which f subdivides Rd is
lower bounded as
N ≥ 2√piΓ(
d+1
2 )
Γ(d2 )
(
r1 + rch2 Λ2
4τ
) d−1
2
. (10)
Written asymptotically, N ∈ Ω
(√
d
2d
(
r1+rch2 Λ2
τ
) d−1
2
)
Proof. For f to be robust to -adversarial examples for  ≤ rch2 Λ2 − τ the decision boundary Df ⊂ Λτ . The
boundary of Λτ is comprised of two disjoint (d − 1)-spheres, which we will denote as ∂Λτ1 and ∂Λτ2 with radii
r1 + rch2 Λ2 − τ and r1 + rch2 Λ2 + τ respectively. (It is standard in topology to use the ∂ symbol to denote the
boundary of a topological space.)
The isoperimetric inequality states that a (d−1)-sphere minimizes the (d−1)-dimensional volume (thought of
as “surface area”) across all sets with fixed d-dimensional volume (thought of as “volume”). Since Df ⊂ Λτ , the
d-dimensional volume enclosed by Df is at least as large as that of ∂Λτ1 and so we have that surf ∂Λτ1 ≤ surf Df .
Now consider any (d− 1)-dimensional linear facet Π of the decision boundary Df . The normal space of Π is
1-dimensional; let n denote a unit vector orthogonal to Π. (There are two possible choices n and−n.) Due to the
spherical symmetry of Λτ and the fact that Π ⊂ Λτ , the diameter of Π is maximized when Π is tangent to ∂Λτ1 at
(r1 + rch2 Λ2− τ)n (or−(r1 + rch2 Λ2− τ)n) and intersects ∂Λτ2 . In pursuit of an upper bound, we will assume
without loss of generality that Π has these properties. Let o denote the origin, x = (r1 + rch2 Λ2 − τ)n, and
y ∈ Π ∩ ∂Λτ2 . We consider the right triangle 4oxy with right angle at x. By basic properties of right triangles,
diam Π
2 ≤ ‖x − y‖2 =
√
(r1 + rch2 Λ2 + τ)2 − (r1 + rch2 Λ2 − τ)2 =
√
4τ(r1 + rch2 Λ2). It follows that Π
is contained in a (d − 1)-dimensional ball of radius √4τ(r1 + rch2 Λ2). In particular the (d − 1)-dimensional
volume of Π is bounded as vold−1(Π) ≤ vold−1B(0,
√
4τ(r1 + rch2 Λ2)). The (d− 1)-dimensional volume of
Df (again thought of as “surface area”), is equal to the sum of the (d−1)-dimensional volumes of the linear facets
that comprise Df . Combining these inequalities gives the result.
2pi
d
2
Γ(d2 )
(r1 + rch2 Λ2)
d−1 = surf ∂Λτ1 ≤ surf Df
≤ N vold−1B(0,
√
4τ(r1 + rch2 Λ2))
≤ N pi
d−1
2
Γ(d+12 )
(4τ(r1 + rch2 Λ2))
d−1
2
2
√
pi
Γ(d+12 )
Γ(d2 )
(
r1 + rch2 Λ2
4τ
) d−1
2
≤ N
Prior work has experimentally verified that increasing the size of deep networks improves robustness (Madry
et al. (2018)). Theorem 7 proves that there are settings in which robustness requires larger models.
11
8 Experiments
8.1 High Codimension Reduces Robustness
Section 6 suggests that as the codimension increases it should become easier to find adversarial examples. To
verify this, we introduce two synthetic datasets, CIRCLES and PLANES, which allow us to carefully vary the
codimension while maintaining dense samples. The CIRCLES dataset consists of two concentric circles in the
x1-x2-plane, the first with radius r1 = 1 and the second with radius r2 = 3, so that rch2 Λ2 = 1. We densely
sample 1000 random points on each circle for both the training and the test sets. The PLANES dataset consists of
two 2-dimensional planes, the first in the xd = 0 and the second in xd = 2, so that rch2 Λ2 = 1. The first two
axis of both planes are bounded as −10 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 10, while x3 = . . . = xd−1 = 0. We sample the training set
at the vertices of the grid described in Section 6, and the test set at the centers of the grid cubes, the blue points in
Figure 4. Both planes are sampled so that the 1-tubular neighborhood X1 covers the underlying planes, where X
is the training set. See Figure 8 for a visualization of CIRCLES and PLANES.
Figure 8: We create two synthetic datasets which allow us to perform controlled experiments on the affect of
codimension on adversarial examples. Left: CIRCLES, Right: PLANES
We consider two attacks, the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al. (2014)) and the basic
iterative method (BIM) (Kurakin et al. (2016)) under ‖·‖2. We use the implementations provided in the cleverhans
library (Papernot et al. (2018)). Further implementation details are provided in Appendix E. Our experimental
results are averaged over 20 retrainings of our model architecture, using Adam (Kingma and Ba (2015)). Further
implementation details are provided in Appendix E.
Figure 9 (Top Left, Bottom Left) shows the robustness of naturally trained networks to FGSM and BIM attacks
on the CIRCLES dataset as we increase the codimension. For both attacks we see a steady decrease in robustness
as we increase the codimension, on average. The result is reproducible with other optimization procedures; Figure
15 in Appendix C.1 shows the results for SGD.
In Figure 9 (Top Right, Bottom Right), we use a nearest neighbor (NN) classifier to classify the adversarial
examples generated by FGSM and BIM for our naturally trained networks on CIRCLES. Nearest neighbors is
robust even when the codimension is high, as long as the low-dimensional data manifold is well sampled. This is
a consequence of the fact that the Voronoi cells of the samples are elongated in the directions normal to the data
manifold when the sample is dense (Dey (2007)).
Madry et al. (2018) propose training against a projected gradient descent (PGD) adversary to improve robust-
ness. Section 6 suggests that this should be insufficient to guarantee robustness, as X is often a poor model for
M. We follow the adversarial training procedure of Madry et al. (2018) by against a PGD adversary with  = 1
under ‖ · ‖2-perturbations on the PLANES dataset. Figure 10 (Left) shows that it is still easy to find adversarial
examples for  < 1 and that as the codimension increases we can find adversarial examples for decreasing values
of . In contrast, a nearest neighbor classifier (Right) achieves perfect robustness for all  on this data.
The PLANES dataset is sampled so that the trianing set is a 1-cover of the underlying planes, which requires
450 sample points. Figure 11 shows the results of increasing the sampling density to a 0.5-cover (1682 samples)
and a 0.25-cover (6498 samples). Increasing the sampling density improves the robustness of adversarial training
at the same codimension and particularly in low-codimension. However adversarial training with a substantially
larger training set does not produce a classifier as robust as a nearest neighbor classifier on a much smaller training
set. Nearest neighbors is much more sample efficient than adversarial training, as predicted by Theorem 3.
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Figure 9: As the codimension increases the robustness of decision boundaries learned by Adam on naturally
trained networks decreases steadily. Top Left: Effectiveness of FGSM attacks as codimension increases. Bottom
Left: BIM attacks. Top and Bottom Right: A nearest neighbor classifier exhibits essentially perfect accuracy to
the adversarial examples generated for our naturally trained networks by FGSM and BIM for all  and codimen-
sion.
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Figure 10: Left: Training using the adversarial training procedure of Madry et al. (2018) is no guarantee of
robustness; as the codimension increases it becomes easier to find adversarial examples using BIM attacks. Right:
The performance of a nearest neighbor classifier on this data is perfect for all  and codimension.
8.2 Adversarial Perturbations are in the Directions Normal to the Data Manifold
Let ηx be an adversarial perturbation generated by FGSM with  = 1 at x ∈ M. Note that the adversarial
example is constructed as xˆ = x + ηx. In Figure 12 we plot a histogram of the angles ∠(ηx, NxM) between
ηx and the normal space NxM for the CIRCLES dataset in codimensions 1, 10, 100, and 500. In codimension 1,
88% of adversarial perturbations make an angle of less than 10◦ with the normal space. Similarly in codimension
10, 97%, in codimension 100, 96%, and in codimension 500, 93%. As Figure 12 shows, nearly all adversarial
perturbations make an angle less than 20◦ with the normal space. Our results are averaged over 20 retrainings of
the model using SGD.
Throughout this paper we’ve argued that high codimension is a key source of the pervasiveness of adversarial
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Figure 11: Adversarial training of Madry et al. (2018) on the PLANES dataset with a 1-cover (left), consisting of
450 samples, a 0.5-cover (center), 1682 samples, and a 0.25-cover (right), 6498 samples. Increasing the sampling
density improves robustness at the same codimension. However even training on a significantly denser training
set does not produce a classifier as robust as a nearest neighbor classifier on a much sparser training set, Figure 10
(Right).
examples. Figure 12 shows that, when the underlying data manifold is well sampled, adversarial perturbations
are well aligned with the normal space. When the codimension is high, there are many directions normal to the
manifold and thus many directions in which to construct adversarial perturbations.
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Figure 12: Histograms of the angle deviations of FGSM perturbations from the normal space for the CIRCLES
dataset in, from right to left, codimensions 1, 10, 100, and 500. Nearly all perturbations make an angle of less
than 20◦ with the normal space.
8.3 A Gradient-Free Geometric Attack
Most current attacks rely on the gradient of the loss function at a test sample to find a direction towards the decision
boundary. Partial resistance against such attacks can be achieved by obfuscating the gradients, but Athalye et al.
(2018) showed how to circumvent such defenses. Brendel et al. (2018) propose a gradient-free attack for ‖ · ‖2,
that starts from a misclassified point and walks toward the original point.
In this section we propose a gradient-free attack that only requires oracle access to a model, meaning we only
query the model for a prediction. Consider a point x ∈ Xtest and the ‖ · ‖p-ball B(x, r) centered at x of radius
r. To construct an adversarial perturbation ηx ∈ B(0, r), giving an adversarial example xˆ = x + ηx, we project
every point in Xtest onto B(x, r) and query the oracle for a prediction for each point. If there exists y ∈ Xtest
that is projected to a point y′ ∈ B(x, r) and that is classified differently from x, we take ηx = y′ − x, otherwise
ηx = 0. This incredibly simple attack reduces the accuracy of the pretrained robust model of Madry et al. (2018)
for ‖ · ‖∞ and  = 0.3 to 90.6%, less than two percent shy of the current SOTA for whitebox attacks, 88.79%
(Zheng et al. (2018)).
Simple datasets, such as CIRCLES and PLANES, allow us to diagnose issues in learning algorithms in settings
where we understand how the algorithm should behave. For example Athalye et al. (2018) state that the work of
Madry et al. (2018) does not suffer from obfuscated gradients. In Appendix D we provide evidence that Madry
et al. (2018) does suffer from the obfuscated gradients problem, failing one of Athalye et al. (2018)’s criteria for
detecting obfuscated gradients.
8.4 MNIST
To explore performance on a more realistic dataset, we compared nearest neighbors with robust and natural models
on MNIST. We considered two attacks: BIM under l∞ norm against the natural and robust models as well as a
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Figure 13: Robustness of nearest neighbors on MNIST. Left: Performance on l∞ BIM attack against a naturally
trained model. Center: The same for the adversarially trained convolutional models of Madry et al. (2018).
Right: Performance of the robust model and nearest neighbors on examples generated by a custom attack on
nearest neighbors.
custom attack against nearest neighbors. Each of these attacks are generated from the MNIST test set. Architecture
details can be found in Appendix E. Figure 13 (Left) shows that nearest neighbors is substantially more robust to
BIM attacks than the naturally trained model. Figure 13 (Center) shows that nearest neighbors is comparable to
the robust model up to  = 0.3, which is the value for which the robust model was trained. After  = 0.3, nearest
neighbors is substantially more robust to BIM attacks than the robust model. At  = 0.5, nearest neighbors
maintains accuracy of 78% to adversarial perturbations that cause the accuracy of the robust model to drop to 0%.
In Appendix C.2 we provide a similar result for FGSM attacks.
Figure 13 (Right) shows the performance of nearest neighbors and the robust model on adversarial examples
generated for nearest neighbors. The nearest neighbor attacks are generated as follows: iteratively find the k
nearest neighbors and compute an attack direction by walking away from the neighbors in the true class and
toward the neighbors in other classes. We find that nearest neighbors is able to be tricked by this approach, but the
robust model is not. This indicates that the errors of these models are distinct and suggests that ensemble methods
may be effective.
A closer investigation shows strong qualitative differences between the BIM adversarial examples and the
examples generated for nearest neighbors. The top row of Figure 14 shows four samples from the MNIST test set.
The second and third rows show adversarial examples generated from those four samples for nearest neighbors
and the robust model respectively. We observe an immediate qualitative difference between rows two and three:
the adversarial examples for the nearest neighbors classifier begin to look like numbers from the target class! It can
reasonably be argued that the fact that the classifications of the robust model do not change is as much of an error
as being fooled by a standard adversarial example. For example the rightmost image of row two in Figure 14 would
be classified as an 8 by most people, while the robust model is confident this image is a 0 with confidence 0.91.
The confidence value of the robust model should decrease significantly for this image. This provides evidence that
nearest neighbors is doing a better job of the learning the human decision boundary between numbers.
9 Conclusion
We have presented a geometric framework for proving robustness guarantees for learning algorithms. Our frame-
work is general and can be used to describe the robustness of any classifier. We have shown that no single model
can be simultaneously robust to attacks under all norms, that nearest neighbor classifiers are theoretically more
sample efficient than adversarial training, and that robustness requires larger deep ReLU networks. Most im-
portantly, we have highlighted the role of codimension in contributing to adversarial examples and verified our
theoretical contributions with experimental results.
We believe that a geometric understanding of the decision boundaries learned by deep networks will lead to
both new geometrically inspired attacks and defenses. In Section 8.3 we provided a novel gradient-free geometric
attack in support of this claim. Finally we believe future work into the geometric properties of decision boundaries
learned by various optimization procedures will provide new techniques for black-box attacks.
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Figure 14: Comparison of adversarial examples for nearest neighbor with adversarial examples for Madry et al.
(2018). The top row is the original data that the examples were generated from. Each figure is labelled with the
predictions from robust neural network. An immediate qualitative difference between adversarial examples for
nearest neighbors and those for the robust model is apparent; the nearest neighbor examples are starting to look
like numbers from a target class.
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A Auxiliary Results
Lemma 8. LetM1,M2 ⊂ Rd be k-dimensional manifolds such thatM∩M2 = ∅. Let Λp be their decision
axis for any p > 0 and let γ : [0, 1]→ Rd be any path such that γ(0) ∈ M1 and γ(1) ∈ M2. Then γ ∩M 6= ∅,
that is γ must cross the decision axis.
Proof. Define f1, f2 : [0, 1] → R as f1(t) = d(γ(t),M1) and f2(t) = d(γ(t),M2). Consider the function
g(t) = f1(t)− f2(t). SinceM1 ∩M2 = ∅ and γ starts onM1 and terminates onM2 the function g(0) < 0 and
g(1) > 0. Then, since g is continuous, the Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there exists t1 ∈ [0, 1] such
that g(t1) = 0. Thus d(γ(t1),M1) = d(γ(t1),M2), which implies that γ(t1) is on the decision axis Λ.
Theorem 9. Let f be any classifier onM =M1∪M2. The maximum accuracy achievable, assuming a uniform
distribution, onM is
1− 1
2
vol(M1 ∩M2)
vol(M1 ∪M2)
. (11)
Proof. It is clearly optimal to classify points in vol(M1\M2) as class 1 and to classify points in vol(M2\M1) as
class 2. Such a classifier can only be wrong when points lie in this intersection. For points in this intersection, the
probability of a misclassification is 12 for any classification that f makes. Thus, the probability of misclassification
is
1
2
vol(M1 ∩M2)
vol(M1 ∪M2)
.
Corollary 10. For  < rchp (Λp;M) there exists a decision boundary that correctly classifiesM.
Proof. For  < rchp Λp,M ∩ Λp = ∅ and so Λp is one such decision boundary.
B Additional Theoretical Results
A finite sample X ofM is said to exhibit Hausdorff noise up to τ if X ⊂ Mτ . That is every sample lies in a
τ -tubular neighborhood ofM, not necessarily onM. We can show a similar result to Theorem 3 for fnn under
moderate amounts of Hausdorff noise.
Theorem 11. Let X be a finite set sampled fromM such that X ⊂ Mτ for some τ < rchp Λp; that is X lies
nearM, in a τ -tubular neighborhood. If X is a δ-cover with δ ≤ 2(rchp Λp− )− τ , then fnn correctly classifies
M.
Proof. Let q ∈ Mi . The distance from q to any sampled in Mj for j 6= i is lower bounded as d(q,Mτj ) ≥
2 rchp Λp − − τ . It is then both necessary and sufficient that there exists a sample x ∈ Mτi such that d(q, x) ≤
2 rchp Λp− − τ . The distance from q to the nearest sample inMτi is upper bounded by the δ-cover condition as
d(q, x) ≤ + δ. It suffices that
d(q, x) ≤ + δ ≤ 2 rchp Λp − − τ ≤ d(q,Mτj ),
which implies that δ ≤ 2(rchp Λp − )− τ .
Theorem 12. Let z ∈ Dfnn be a point on the decision boundary of fnn for a δ-cover X with δ < 1. Let σ ⊂ Dfnn
be a linear facet of Dfnn and note that σ is a Voronoi facet, let σ∗ = pq be the dual Delaunay edge of σ such that
p ∈ M1 and q ∈ M2. Define d(z,M1) = ω1 rch2 Λ2 and d(z,M2) = ω2 rch2 Λ2, with ω1 < ω2 < 1. Then
there exists a decision axis point m ∈ Λ such that d(z,m) ≤ δ2+(ω22−ω21)+2δω2
1+(ω2−ω21) ω2 rch2 Λ2.
Proof. If z ∈ Λ2 then the result holds, so suppose that z 6∈ Λ2.
The decision boundary Dfnn is the union of a subset of (d − 1)-dimensional Voronoi cells (along with their
lower dimensional faces) of the Voronoi diagram VorX of X with the following property. For every Voronoi
(d − 1)-cell σ ∈ Dfnn , its dual Delaunay edge σ∗ = pq has endpoints p, q ∈ X such that p ∈ M1 and q ∈ M2.
That is, p and q have different class labels. In particular pq crosses Λ2. For every point z ∈ σ, d(z, p) =
d(z, q) ≤ mini d(z,Xi); that is, p, q minimize the distance from z to any sample point in X . In the interior of
σ this inequality is strict, while on the boundary of σ it may be realized by more points than just p and q. (See
Appendix G for a brief review of Voronoi diagrams and Delaunay triangulations.)
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Let σ ∈ Dfnn be a Voronoi (d − 1)-cell that contains z and let σ∗ = pq be σ’s dual Delaunay edge. Imagine
growing a ball B centered at z by increasing the radius r starting from 0. Due to the properties of Voronoi cells
outlined above, the fact that z 6∈ Λ2, and the fact that X ⊂ M, the following three events occur in order as
we increase r. First B intersects the manifold to which z is closest, without loss of generality M1. Second B
intersectsM2. Notice that at this point B has not intersected any sample points in X , since p and q are onM1
andM2 respectively and are the closest samples to z. Third B intersects p and q, when r = d(z, p). Let r1, r2, r3
denote the value of the radius at these three event points respectively. Similarly let B1, B2, B3 denote the balls
centered at z with radii r1, r2, r3 respectively. Let z1 ∈ B1 ∩M1 and let z2 ∈M2 ∩B2. SinceM1 is the closer
of the two manifolds to z, the line segment zz2 must intersect Λ2. Let γ : [0, 1] → Rd parameterize the line
segment zz2, where γ(0) = z, γ(1) = z2, and ‖z − γ(t)‖2 = r2t. We will show that there exists a decision axis
point m ∈ γ that is close to z.
The ball B2 is tangent toM2 at z2 but contains some portion ofM1. Our approach will be to move the center
of B2 along γ from z to z2 while maintaining tangency at z2. That is we consider the balls Bt = B(γ(t), ‖γ(t)−
z2‖2) as t increase from 0 to 1. For some t∗, Bt∗ ∩M1 = ∅ which means that we have crossed the decision axis.
We will prove that t∗ must be small which implies that ‖z −m‖2 ≤ ‖z − γ(t∗)‖2 ≤ r2t∗ is small.
We begin by considering the triangle4z1zz2. Using the law of cosines we derive an expression for the angle
∠z1zz2 as
‖z1 − z2‖22 = r21 + r22 − 2r1r2 cos∠z1zz2
cos∠z1zz2 =
r21 + r
2
2 − ‖z1 − z2‖22
2r1r2
.
As t increases the event Bt ∩M1 = ∅ occurs when the distances from γ(t) to any point x ∈ B2 ∩M1 is
greater than r2(1− t). Due to the δ-cover condition at z1 and the fact that B2 ⊂ B3 where B3 is the event where
a ball centered at z intersects a sample point, every such x must lie in a ball B(z1, g) for g ≤ δ. Thus the event
Bt ∩M1 = ∅ occurs for the minimum t such that
‖z1 − γ(t)‖2 − g ≥ r2(1− t)
‖z1 − γ(t)‖22 ≥ r22(1− t)2 + 2gr2(1− t) + g2.
First we derive an expression for ‖z1 − γ(t)‖2 again using the law of cosines and substituting the expression
for ∠z1zz2.
‖z1 − γ(t)‖22 = r21 + r22t2 − 2r1r2t cos∠z1zz2
= r21 + r
2
2t
2 − t(r21 + r22 − ‖z1 − z2‖22)
= (1− t)r21 + (t− 1)tr22 + t‖z1 − z2‖22.
So then ‖z1 − γ(t)‖22 ≥ r22(1− t)2 + 2gr2(1− t) + g2 holds if and only if
(1− t)r22 + (t− 1)tr22 + t‖z1 − z2‖22 ≥ r22(1− t)2 + 2gr2(1− t) + g2
t ≤ g
2 − r21 + 2gr2 + r22
‖z1 − z2‖2 − r21 + 2gr2 + r22
≤ g
2 − r21 + 2gr2 + r22
‖z1 − z2‖2 − r21 + r22
≤ δ
2 + (ω22 − ω21) + 2δω2
1 + (ω2 − ω21)
C Additional Experiments
We present additional experiments to support our theoretical predictions. We reproduce the results of Section 8
using different optimization algorithms (Section C.1) and attack methods (Section C.2). These additional experi-
ments are consistent with our conclusions in Section 8.
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C.1 Reproducing Results using SGD
In Section 8.1 we showed that increasing the codimension reduces the robustness of the decision boundaries
learned by Adam on CIRCLES. In Figure 15 we reproduce this result using SGD. Again we see that as we increase
the codimension the robustness decreases. SGD presents with much less variances than Adam, which we attribute
to implicit regularization that has been observed for SGD (Soudry et al. (2018))
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Figure 15: As in the case of training with Adam, we see a steady decrease in robustness on the CIRCLES dataset
as the codimension increases when training with SGD.
Next we consider the adversarial training procedure of Madry et al. (2018) using SGD instead of Adam. We
note that the authors of Madry et al. (2018) use Adam in their own experiments. Figure 16 shows that the result is
consist with the result in Section 8.1. Again SGD presents with lower variance.
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Figure 16: Adverarial training with a PGD adversary, as in Figure 9, using SGD. Similarly we see a drop in
robustness as the codimension increases.
C.2 Reproducing Results using FGSM
In Section 8.1 we evaluated the robustness of nearest neighbors against BIM attacks under the ‖ · ‖∞ on MNIST.
In Figure 17 we evaluate the robustness of nearest neighbors against FGSM attacks under the ‖ · ‖∞ on MNIST.
We use the naturally pretrained (natural) and adversarially pretrained (robust) convolutional models provided by
Madry et al. (2018)1. Figure 17 (Left) shows that nearest neighbors is substantially more robust to FGSM attacks
than the naturally trained model. Figure 17 (Right) shows that nearest neighbors is comparable to the robust
model up to  = 0.3, which is the value for which the robust model was trained. After  = 0.3, nearest neighbors
is substantially more robust to FGSM attacks than the robust model. At  = 0.5, nearest neighbors maintains
accuracy of 78% to adversarial perturbations that cause the accuracy of the robust model to drop to 39%.
D The Madry Defense Suffers from Obfuscated Gradients
Athalye et al. (2018) identified the problem of “obfuscated gradients”, a type of a gradient masking (Papernot
et al. (2017)) that many proposed defenses employed to defend against adversarial examples. They identified
three different types of obfuscated gradients: shattered gradients, stochastic gradeints, and exploding/vanishing
1https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge
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Figure 17: Robustness of nearest neighbors against the naturally trained (left) and adversarially trained (right)
convolutional models of Madry et al. (2018) against FGSM attacks under the ‖ · ‖∞ norm on MNIST.
gradients. They examined nine recently proposed defenses, concluded that seven suffered from at least one type
of obfuscated gradient, and showed how to circumvent each type of obfuscated gradient and thus each defense
that employed obfuscated gradients.
Regarding the work of Madry et al. (2018), Athalye et al. (2018) stated “We believe this approach does not
cause obfuscated gradients”. They note that “our experiments with optimization based attacks do succeed with
some probability”. In this section we provide evidence that the defense of Madry et al. (2018) does suffer from
obfuscated gradients, specifically shattered gradients. Shattered gradients occur when a defence causes the gradi-
ent field to be “nonexistent or incorrect” (Athalye et al. (2018)). Specifically we provide evidence that the defense
of Madry et al. (2018) works by shattering the gradient field of the loss function around the data manifolds.
In Figure 18 (Left) we show the normalized gradient field of the loss function for a network trained on a 2-
dimensional version of our PLANES dataset using the adversarial training procedure of Madry et al. (2018) with
a PGD adversary. While the gradients have meaningful directions, Figure 18 (Left) shows that magnitude of the
gradient field is nearly 0 everywhere around the data manifolds, which are at y = 0 and y = 2. The only notable
gradients are near the decision axis which is at y = 1.
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Figure 18: (Left) The normalized gradient field of the loss for an adversarially trained network. (Right) The
magnitudes of the gradient. Notice that the gradients are largely 0 except at the decision axis y = 1.
One criteria that Athalye et al. (2018) propose for identifying obfuscated gradients is whether one-step attacks
perform better than iterative attacks. The reason this criteria is useful for identifying obfuscated gradients is
because one-step attacks like FGSM first normalize the gradient, ignoring its magnitude, then take as large of a
step as allowed in the direction of the normalized gradient. So long as the gradient on the manifold points towards
the decision boundary, FGSM will be effective at finding an adversarial example.
In Figure 19 we show the adversarial examples generated using PGD (left), FGSM (center), and BIM (right)
for  = 1 starting at the test set for the PLANES dataset. FGSM produces adversarial examples at the decision
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axis y = 1, exactly where we would expect. Notice that all of the adversarial perturbation is normal to the
data manifold, suggesting that the gradient on the manifold points towards the decision boundary. However the
adversarial examples produced by PGD lie closer to the manifold from which the example was generated.
PGD splits the total perturbation between both the normal and the tangent spaces of the data manifold, as
shown by the arrows in Figure 19. This suggests that, when trained adversarially, the network learned a gradient
field that has small but correct gradients on the data manifold, but gradients that curve in the tangent directions
immediately off the manifold.
Lastly notice that BIM, another iterative method, also produces adversarial examples that are near the decision
axis. Athalye et al. (2018) cite success with iterative based optimization procedures as evidence against obfuscated
gradients. However BIM also ignores the magnitude of the gradient, as it simply applies FGSM iteratively. The
network has learned a gradient field that is overfit to the particulars of the PGD attack. BIM successfully navigates
this gradient field, while PGD does not. While the network is robust to PGD attacks at test time, it is less robust
to FGSM and BIM attacks.
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Figure 19: Adverarial examples generated using PGD (left), FGSM (center), and BIM (right). While the network
is robust to PGD attacks, FGSM and BIM attacks are more effective because they ignore the magnitude of the
gradient. For PGD we draw arrows from the test sample to the adversarial example generated from that point to
aid the reader.
E Implementation Details
For the iterative attacks BIM and PGD, we set the number of iterations to 30 with a step size of step = 0.05 per
iteration.
Our controlled experiments on synthetic data consider a fully connected network with 1 hidden layer, 100
hidden units, and ReLU activations. This model architecture is more than capable of representing a nearly perfect
robust decision boundary for both CIRCLES and PLANES, the latter of which is linearly separable. We set the
learning rate for Adam as α = 0.1, which we found to work best for our datasets. The parameters for the
exponential decay of the first and second moment estimates were set to β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999. We set the
learning rate for SGD as α = 0.1 and decrease the learning rate by a factor of 10 every 100 epochs. We train all
of our models for 250 epochs, following Wilson et al. (2017). We train using a cross-entropy loss.
All of our experiments are implemented using PyTorch. When comparing against a published result we use
publicly available repositories, if able. For the robust loss of Wong and Kolter (2018), we use the code provided by
the authors2.The provided implementation3 of the adversarial training procedure of Madry et al. (2018) considers
a PGD adversary with ‖ · ‖∞-perturbations. We reimplemented their adversarial training procedure for ‖ · ‖2-
perturbations following their implementation and using the PGD attack implemented in the cleverhans library
(Papernot et al. (2018)).
The models of Madry et al. (2018) consist of two convolutional layers with 32 and 64 filters respectively, each
followed by 2× 2 max pooling. After the two convolutional layers, there are two fully connected layers each with
1024 hidden units.
2https://github.com/locuslab/convex_adversarial
3https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge
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F Volume Arguments for d-Spheres
Let S ⊂ Rd+1 be a unit d-sphere embedded in Rd+1. The volume of S is given by
volS =
pid/2((1 + )d − (1− )d)
Γ(1 + d2 )
, (12)
where Γ denotes the gamma function. Let X ⊂ S be a finite sample of size n of S. The set X is the set of all 
perturbations of points in X under the norm ‖ · ‖2. How well does X approximate S as a function of n, d and ?
To answer this question we upper bound the ratio volX/ volS by generously assuming that the balls
B(Xi, ) are disjoint. The resulting upper bound is
volX
volS
≤ n volB
volS
=
nd
(1 + )d − (1− )d . (13)
In Figure 20 we show three different views of this bound. In Figure 20 (Left) we set n = 1012 and plot four
different values of ; in each case the percentage of volume of S that is covered by X quickly approaches 0.
Similarly, in Figure 20 (Center), if we fix  = 1 and plot four different values of n, in each case we have the same
result. Finally in Figure 20 (Right) we plot a lower bound on number of samples necessary to cover S by X for
four different values of ; in each case the number of samples necessary grows exponentially with the dimension.
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Figure 20: Three different perspectives on our upper bound in Equation 13. (Left, Center) In each case the
percentage of S covered by X goes to 0. (Right) The number of points necessary to cover S by X grows
exponentially with the dimension.
G Voronoi Diagrams and Delaunay Triangulations
Let X ⊂ Rd be a finite set of n points. The Voronoi diagram of X , denoted VorX , under the metric d(·, ·) is a
subdivision of Rd into n cells where each cell is defined as
Vor v = {x ∈ Rd : d(x, v) ≤ d(x, u),∀u ∈ X\{v}}. (14)
In words, the Voronoi cell Vor v of v ∈ X is the set of all points in Rd that are closer to v than any other sample
point u 6= v in X . The Voronoi diagram is then defined as the set of all Voronoi cells, VorX = {Vor v : v ∈ X}.
When d(·, ·) is induced by the norm ‖ · ‖2, the Voronoi cells are convex. See Figure 21.
The Delaunay triangulation of X , denoted DelX is a triangulation of the convex hull of X into d-simplices.
Every d-simplex τ ∈ DelX , as well as every lower-dimensional face of τ , has the defining property that there
exists an empty circumscribing ball B such that the vertices of τ lie on the boundary of B and the interior of
B is free from any points in X . See Figure 21. This empty circumscribing ball property of Delaunay triangu-
lations implies many desirable properties that are useful in mesh generation (Cheng et al. (2012)) and manifold
reconstruction (Edelsbrunner and Shah (1997)). The Delaunay triangulation of a point set always exists, but is not
unique in general.
There exists a well known duality between the Voronoi diagram and the Delaunay triangulation of X . For
every j-dimensional face σ ∈ VorX there exist a dual (d − j)-dimensional simplex denoted σ∗ ∈ DelX whose
d− j + 1 vertices are the d− j + 1 vertices of X whose Voronoi cells intersect at σ. In particular, every d-cell of
VorX is dual to the vertex of DelX that generates that cell, and every (d − 1)-face of VorX is dual to an edge
of DelX .
A nearest neighbor classifier fnn given a query point q simply returns the class of the point inX that generated
the Voronoi cell in which q lies. Thus the decision boundary of fnn is the union of (d− 1) and lower dimensional
Voronoi faces. Furthermore, when X is a dense sample of a manifoldM, the Voronoi cells are well known to be
elongated in the directions normal toM Dey (2007). This fact underlies many of our results.
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Figure 21: The Voronoi diagram of a set of points in R2 (left) and its dual the Delaunay triangulation (right).
H Visualization of Decision Boundaries
In Figure 22 we provide visualizations of the decision boundaries learned by (a-d) our fully connected network
architecture with cross entropy loss for various optimization procedures and various training lengths, and (e) a
nearest neighbor classifier for ‖ · ‖2 on the training set. Specifically we train on the CIRCLES dataset, embedded
in R3. The training set is entirely contained in the xy-plane. We then visualize cross sections of the decision
boundary for various values of z ∈ [−5, 5]. We color points labeled as in the same class as the outer circle
with the color blue and points labeled as in the same class as the inner circle as orange. Figure 22 shows the
cross sections of the decision boundaries, averaged over 20 retrainings. The visualization shows how various
optimization algorithms learn decision boundaries that extend into the normal directions where no data is provided.
(a) Decision boundary learned by running SGD for 25 epochs, averaged over 20 trainings.
(b) Decision boundary learned by running SGD for 250 epochs, averaged over 20 trainings.
(c) Decision boundary learned by running Adam for 25 epochs, averaged over 20 trainings.
(d) Decision boundary learned by running Adam for 250 epochs, averaged over 20 trainings.
(e) Decision boundary of a nearest neighbor classifier for the ‖ · ‖2 norm.
Figure 22: The training set lies entirely in the xy-plane, shown here at z = 0. We visualize cross sections of the
decision boundary for z ∈ [−5, 5] for various optimization algorithms training for different lengths of time. The
results show how various optimization algorithm learn decision boundaries that extend into the normal directions
in which there is no data provided. We average the decision boundary over 20 retrainings, so faded results indicate
how frequently a point was labeled a specific class.
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